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being protection from a void injunction issued without jurisdiction,
and the State's interest being preventing any of its courts from
acting without jurisdiction. Thus the State may properly institute
and maintain a prohibition proceeding to protect the rights of
an unincorporated association such as P. State ex rel. Glass Bottle
Blowers Ass'n of the United States & Canada v. Silver, 155 S.E.2d
564 (W. Va. 1967).
In West Virginia the only unincorporated associations presently
subject to suit under a common name are a cooperative agricultural
marketing or credit association, W. VA. CODE ch. 19, art. 4, § 4
(Michie 1966), and a common carrier, W. VA. CODE ch. 56, art.
3, § 15 (Michie 1966). All other unincorporated associations fall
within the common law rule, that since they have no legal entity
distinct from that of their members they may not sue or be sued
in the organization's own name.
Sales-Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code
D, for the purpose of making coke, bought coal from one of two
piles exhibited near the mouth of P's newly opened mine. P had
shown D a sample with a low percentage of ash, suited for coke-
making, taken from another part of the mine. At D's request P
had the coal cleaned and shipped. After the delivery D told P to
stop loading coal until an analysis could be made to determine ash
content, but after looking at the same coal pile, allowed three more
truckloads to be delivered. An analysis of the coal later showed
that the ash content was too high for coke making, and D refused
to pay for the coal. In an action to recover the value, the jury
returned a verdict for P, and judgment was entered thereon. Held,
affirmed. There was no express or implied warranty of merchanti-
bility, an issue properly determined by the jury. D's inspection of
the coal before delivery excluded any warranties under W. VA.
CODE ch. 46, art. 2, § 316 (Michie 1966). Sylvia Coal Co. v.
Mercury Coal and Coke Co., 156 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1967).
As the court points out in its opinion, this is one of the first cases
in West Virginia involving provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code as embodied in W. VA. CODE ch. 46 (Michie 1966). In this
same area of warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code, see
Shreve v. Casto Trailer Sales, Inc., 150 W. Va. 669, 149 S.E.2d 238
(1966).
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The decision in the principal case rested on two fact determina-
tions made by the jury: that even though P exhibited the sample,
he did not represent it as coming from the coal piles near the mine,
and that D relied on his own examination of the coal rather than
on any statements or representations made by P who had no ex-
perience in the sale of coal for any purpose. With these facts
determined, the Uniform Commercial Code, W. VA. CoDE ch. 46,
art. 2, § 316 (Michie 1966), clearly excludes any possibility of
express or implied warranties.
Tort Liability-Turnpike Commission
P's decedents were killed in an accident involving two vehicles
on a state turnpike. Conflicting evidence was introduced at the
trial concerning the icy condition of the highway at the time of
the accident. On appeal, the issue arose as to the turnpike's
liability for failure to keep the highway free of ice and snow. Held,
W. VA. CODE ch. 17, art. 10, § 17 (Michie 1966), and W. VA. CODE
ch. 17, art. 10, § 18 (Michie 1966) changed the common law and
created a basis of liability which did not exist at common law.
Section 18 reads in part, "Any person injured by reason of a turn-
pike, road or bridge.., being out of repair may recover all dam-
ages . . ." from those responsible for its maintenance. While the
liability of municipal corporations and turnpike commissions under
the statutes is absolute, that does not refer to the cause of action.
The cause of action itself must be established within the terms
of the statutes. The general rule as to municipal corporations and
turnpikes is that normal amounts of ice and snow do not constitute
a defect and do not render the road out of repair. Although ice
and snow may render a street out of repair, there must be an
accumulation amounting to an obstruction before it can be within
the purview of the statute creating a cause of action. Christo v.
Dotson, 155 S.E.2d 571 (W. Va. 1967).
This case supports the well-established principle that reasonable
care does not require a municipality or other public authority to
free its streets and sidewalks from ice and snow which have
naturally accumulated. Generally, liability is rarely imposed and
then ordinarily upon the theory that the ice and snow has created
dangerous formations or obstacles and notice of their existence
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